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1 Introduction
This study develops a two-country Neoclassical model with labor market frictions and endoge-
nous migration to analyze the long-run effects of international labor migration on macroeco-
nomic performance and social welfare. The literature on international macroeconomics has so
far paid a limited attention to the general-equilibrium implications of labor mobility. Studies
that have analyzed the dynamic effects of migration by means of open economy frameworks in-
clude Galor (1986), Miyagiwa (1991), Reichlin and Rustichini (1998), Lundborg and Segerstrom
(2000), Larramona and Sanso (2006), Klein and Ventura (2009), Kim et al. (2010), Levine et al.
(2010), Mandelman and Zlate (2012), Khraiche (2015) and Parello (2017). These studies do not
consider employment/unemployment issues that may arise as a result in the host country labor
market. This study tries to bridge the gap of the literature and investigates how migration af-
fects capital accumulation, labor market conditions and employment in both the origin and the
destination economy. To this end, we extend the dynamic framework with labor market frictions
developed by Hashimoto and Im (2016) to the case of a two-country model with international
labor migration.
In order to build a model as tractable as possible, we focus on an asymmetric scenario in
which the two-country economy is composed of a low-TFP economy (henceforth referred as
“South”) and a high-TFP economy (henceforth referred as “North”). Labor markets are char-
acterized by frictional unemployment and, because of the difference in countries productivity,
only workers in South find it profitable to look for a job abroad.
The choice of a frictional labor market allows us to (i) get a better grasp of the underlying
interdependence between labor market conditions and migration dynamics; (ii) have a better
comprehension of the main dynamic implications of migration on national saving, physical
capital accumulation and social welfare. Indeed, in contrast to the bulk of the literature, in our
model migrants never cut their ties with their original households, and optimally determine the
amount of personal consumption, saving and remittances to be sent to the country of origin.1
Though most of the theoretical contributions on migration and growth consider domestic and
immigrant workers as perfect substitutes in production, in this chapter we follow Parello (2017)
and use a two-level production technology in which natives and immigrants enter production
as imperfect substitutes. As the issue is controversial and the empirical literature has so far
given no clear-cut results on this issue (see, e.g., Cortes, 2008; Card, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri,
2012), in order to account for the contribution of immigrants to the production process in
North, we use a CES aggregator of domestic and migrant workers able to capture all degrees of
substitutability between the two types of workers.
The model is solved for the steady-state equilibrium and then used to explore, through the
1According to World Bank (2018), the estimated remittances to low- and middle-income countries amount
to $466 billions in 2017. India ($ 69 billions), China ($ 64 billions), Philippines ($ 33 billions) and Mexico ($
31 billions) are the largest recipient countries, as well as the top countries from which U.S. immigrant workers
come from. See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for an in-depth review of remittances behavior and their potential
effects on developing countries growth.
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use of several simulation exercises, the long-run effects of an increase in migration intensity on
per capita consumption, employment, remittances and physical capital accumulation. Here, our
ultimate goal is to investigate to what extent changes in labor market conditions, induced by
labor mobility, represent a boon or a bane for both the origin and the destination country.
The main results of the study are the following. First, despite the analytical complexities
of the model, we analytically prove that there always exists a unique steady-state equilibrium
for the world economy. Second, we find that a permanent increase in migration flows causes
per capita consumption to increase worldwide in the post-increase equilibrium. Third, higher
migration intensity spurs job competition in the host labor market and generates a sort of
“displacement effect” that hurts native employment. However, despite native displacement,
increased migration causes overall employment to increase in the destination country, which in
turn induces firms to increase capital accumulation. Fourth, increases in migration flows are
found not to affect the equilibrium wage rate in South, while they are found to asymmetri-
cally affect the equilibrium wage rates in North. Specifically, our simulations show that whilst
immigrant employment suffers a loss in wages because of the competition coming from new
immigrants, the equilibrium wage rate paid to native workers is positively affected by migration
due to the imperfect substitutability hypothesis incorporated in the CES aggregator of labor
types.
We also simulate the welfare effect of migration and find that, though emigration leads to
a permanent increase in output per inhabitant in the host country and to a permanent fall in
the source country, households welfare is found to increase in both countries, with Southern
households gaining relatively more than the Northern ones. This result is due to the increase in
the overall flow of remittances that prevents per capita consumption from falling because of the
reduction in final output. Even though the final effect of increasing labor migration is a reduced
flow of per capita remittances, the increased share of immigrant employment characterizing the
post-shock equilibrium causes the overall flow of remittances to rise, thereby allowing households
in South to compensate for the loss of income due to emigration.
In the last part of the chapter, we also consider an extension of the benchmark model to
the case of a “protectionist” policy consisting in imposing a (distortionary) tax on firms hiring
immigrant workers. In her 2017 French presidential campaign, right-wing candidate Marine Le
Pen proposed to impose an extra tax on the employment of non-French workers with the aim
of protecting national employment. We use Marine Le Pen’s proposed policy as an example to
assess up to what extent protectionist policies can be effective in slowing down migration and
support national employment and welfare. We find that raising a 10 percent tax on immigrant
employment is far from being employment enhancing for the receiving country. Specifically, we
find that, though the imposition of a tax on foreign labor is able to increase native welfare, it
fails to turn down the native displacement effect and leads to a permanent fall in per capita
output and equilibrium employment of the receiving country.
Our study relates to the literature on migration and growth. In particular, our study closely
relates to Mandelman and Zlate (2012) and Parello (2017). Mandelman and Zlate (2012) analyze
the effects of a border enforcement between U.S. and Mexico through a two-country business
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cycle model of labor migration and remittances. In line with our findings, they show that when
foreign labor becomes relatively scarce, immigrants earn higher wages and increase remittances
to their countries of origin. At the same time, a lower share of migrant workers reduces capital
accumulation and dampens labor productivity in the destination economy. However, the authors
completely abstract from employment issues, so that the presence of potential displacement
effects in the host economy are not considered in their model.
Similarly to us, Parello (2017) relies on a CES aggregator to aggregate across native and im-
migrant labor. However, in contrast to our study, Parello’s analysis focuses on a full-employment
small open economy with frictionless migration and finds that both local and global indetermi-
nacy can emerge in the equilibrium. Our study improves upon Parello’s in at least two respects.
First, our model adopts a North-South approach rather than a small open economy approach
to study the macroeconomic implications of migration. Second, in our model migration is not
governed by a frictionless Harris-Todaro migration function as they are in Parello’s, but rather
it is the result of a utility-maximizing decision made by decentralized agents.
Our study also relates to the recent stream of the macroeconomic literature that studies the
macroeconomic implications of migration (both legal and illegal) through search and matching
models. Far from being vast, this literature includes papers by Ortega (2000), Liu (2010),
Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), Chassambouli and Peri (2015), and Battisti et al. (2018).
In particular, a paper closely related to our analysis is Liu (2010), who employs a dynamic
general equilibrium model with labor market frictions to explore the economic consequences of
illegal migration. Although Liu abstracts from legal migration, the presence of search frictions
allows him to identify a new channel through which migration, by intensifying job competition
in the host country, lowers the job finding rate of native unemployed workers, hence generating
a displacement effect in the host country. However, Liu’s analysis focuses on a closed economy
framework with exogenous migration.
The outline of the chapter is the following. Section 2 introduces the baseline version of our
North-South model with migration and characterizes the search equilibrium. Section 3 describes
the calibration procedure used to simulate the model and discusses the main macroeconomic
implications of a permanent increase in Southern workers looking for a job in North. Section 4
presents an extension of the model in which a protectionist policy is introduced by the Northern
government. The extended model is then used to analyze the long-run effects on the global
economy of imposing a tax on the Northern firms that hire immigrant workers. Section 5
provides a sensitivity analysis on the elasticity of substitution between immigrant and native
workers. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a global economy consisting of two countries: a high-TFP North (denoted by N)
and a low-TFP South (denoted by S). Each country produces a non-tradable aggregate good
which can be interchangeably consumed or accumulated as physical capital.
In each country, the population consists of a unit continuum of infinitely-lived households,
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each of which comprises a continuum of identical individuals of measure one. Individuals are
endowed with one unit of time, which they can spend either working for wages or searching
for jobs. The countries are assumed to be symmetric in all respects but two. First, North is
supposed to be more productive in terms of TFP than South. Second, only workers from South
are supposed to migrate in search for better job opportunities and higher wages.
Time is set in continuous time, but for ease of exposition we will suppress the time variable
t where no confusion arises. We begin by presenting a benchmark version of the model in which
firms can freely hire foreign workers without incurring in any sort of restriction. In Section 4
we will relax this assumption by focusing on the special case in which the Northern government
imposes a tax on firms hiring migrants in order to prioritize natives welfare.
2.1 Labor markets and matching
In this section, we describe how labor markets work in both North and South. The way unem-
ployed workers and job vacancies meet follows a matching process similar to that developed by
Pissarides (2000) and then extended by Shi and Wen (1997) and Hashimoto and Im (2016).
2.1.1 The Southern labor market
In South, the total population can be divided into job searchers (denoted by sM ), employed
workers in North (denoted by m) and employed workers in South (denoted by nS), such that
the following resource constraint for labor applies at every moment in time
1 = nS + sM +m. (1)
Among all job searchers, we assume that a fraction φsM - with φ ∈ (0, 1) - resides and
looks for jobs in North, while the complement fraction (1− φ) sM resides and looks for jobs in
South.2 As in Shi and Wen (1997), in this chapter the notion of job searchers conforms to the
notion of unemployment, so that at each moment of time LS ≡ nS + (1 − φ)sM is the size of
the workforce of South and (1− φ)sM/[nS + (1− φ)sM ] is its unemployment rate.
To create a productive job, vacancies and workers must match with each other. We assume
that the process of matching is summarized by a matching function
zS = z¯S [(1− φ) sM ]1− vS , z¯S > 0,  ∈ (0, 1), (2)
where zS is the number of job matches in South, z¯S is a constant capturing the Southern
efficiency of matching, vS is the number of vacancies posted by Southern firms, and  is a given
parameter capturing the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies.
Equation (2) determines the flow of workers who find a job and who exit the unemployment
pool within a time interval of length dt. Dividing both sides of (2) by (1− φ) sM and vN
we obtain, respectively, the instantaneous probability that a Southern worker finds a job in
her home country, and the instantaneous probability that a Southern vacancy is filled. Thus,
2The exogenous parameter φ determines the share of Southern-born workers that look for a job in North and
can be interpreted as the share of effort on looking for a job abroad.
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denoting with θS ≡ vS/ (1− φ) sM the vacancy-unemployment ratio, which we take as a measure
of tightness of the labor market in South, these two probabilities can be written as
zS
(1− φ) sM = z¯Sθ

S ≡ p (θS) (3)
zS
vS
= z¯Sθ
−(1−)
S ≡ q (θS) . (4)
As it is easy to check, p′ (θS) > 0 and q′ (θS) < 0, so that market tightness makes it easier
to find a job for a worker, but harder to fill a vacancy for a firm.
2.1.2 The Northern labor market
In North, the fraction of the population in work can be split into job searchers (denoted by sN ),
and employed workers (denoted by nN ), such that, at each time t, it must be that
1 = nN + sM . (5)
However, because a fraction of m individuals from South are currently working as employed
workers for Northern firms and a fraction φsM are residing in North as unemployed workers, the
size of the labor force differs from that of the native population and is equal to LN = 1+m+φsM .
Moreover, the size of the unemployment pool of North is also inclusive of immigrants workers
and it equates (sN + φsM )/(m+ φsM + sN + nN ).
Denoting the number of vacancies posted by Northern firms as vN , the matching function
of North can be written as
zN = z¯N (sN + φsM )
1− vN , z¯N > 0, (6)
where zN is the number of job matches in South and z¯N is the efficiency parameter of matching
in North.
From (6), it follows that the Northern labor market tightness depends on both types of
unemployed workers, i.e. native unemployed workers sN and immigrant unemployment workers,
φsM . Hence, by defining the labor market tightness of North as θN ≡ vN/(sN + φsM ), it is
easy to verify that an increase in immigration might worsen the conditions of the labor market
of North through the term φsM . Indeed, dividing both sides of (6) by sN + φsM and vN , we
obtain the following pair of expressions for the job finding rate and vacancy filling rate
zN
sN + φsM
= z¯Nθ

N ≡ p (θN ) (7)
zN
vN
= z¯Nθ
−(1−)
N ≡ q (θN ) . (8)
According to (7) and (8), the size of immigrant unemployment affects the probability that a
firm or a worker (both native and immigrant) will meet a partner, implying that migration can
exacerbate the negative search externality on native job searchers and firms.
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2.2 Households
In each country i = {S,N}, households derive utility from consumption, ci, and hold assets in
the form of ownership claims on capital, ki. We suppose that preferences are identical in the
two countries and given by the life-time utility
Ui(t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log (ci) dt, ρ > 0, i = {S,N} , (9)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate of households.
Given an initial value for assets holding ki (0), the objective of the representative household
of country i at time t > 0 is to choose a path for ci to maximize (9) subject to a country-specific
flow budget constraint. Following mainstream search literature, we assume that all household
members completely insure each other against variations in labor income (see, e.g., Merz, 1995;
Andolfatto, 1996). Since Southern households comprise migrants among their members, such
an assumption implies that all migrant workers care about the welfare of their own household,
and send home remittances, below denoted by R, in order to completely smooth risks in con-
sumption within the household of origin.3 As a consequence, the flow budget constraint of the
representative household of South can be written as
k˙S = rSkS + wSnS + bS(1− φ)sM + piS +R− (cS + τS)(1−m− φsM ), (10)
where rS the rate of return on Southern capital kS , wS is the wage rate received by each of the
nS household’s member employed in South, bS is the unemployment benefit paid to each of the
(1− φ)sM household’s members who are currently unemployed, piS is the instantaneous stream
of profits paid by Southern firms and τS is the lump-sum tax of South paid by the 1−m−φsM
members who reside in South at time t.
Similarly, the flow budget constraint of the representative household is given by
k˙N = rNkN + piN + wNnN + bNsN − (τN + cN ) , (11)
where rN is the rate of return on Northern capital kN , wN is the wage rate received by each
employed member of the household, bN is the unemployment benefit paid to each of the sN
unemployed members, piN is the instantaneous stream of profits paid by Northern firms and τN
is the lump-sum tax paid by the household overall at time t.
According to (10) and (11), in each country i the stock of domestic capital ki changes over
time if and only if disposable income turns out to be either larger or smaller than consumption
expenditure. When this happens, the rates at which each domestic economy accumulates capital
equates its current income less the sum of consumption and taxation, and the dynamics of kS
and kN are given by (10) and (11).
Standard maximization techniques yield the familiar Euler conditions
c˙S = cS (rS − ρ) (12)
c˙N = cN (rN − ρ) . (13)
3Mandelman and Zlate (2012) make use of a similar risk sharing mechanism of remittances in their model.
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2.3 Producers
In each country i = {S,N}, there is a continuum of perfectly-competitive firms producing the
non-tradable good yi by combining capital, ki, and labor, `i, according to the Cobb-Douglas
technology
yi = Aik
α
i `
1−α
i , Ai > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) ,
where Ai (with AN > AS) is a given parameter capturing the level of TFP in country i at time
t > 0, and α is the Cobb-Douglas parameter.
In South, labor input, `S , consists of only native Southern workers, nS , while in North
it is given by a mix of native Northern workers, nN , and immigrant workers, m. Following
Ottaviano and Peri (2012), we assume that the contribution of each labor input type to Northern
production is captured by the CES aggregator, `N ≡
[
(1− λ)nηN + λmη
]1/η
, where λ ∈ (0, 1)
is the share parameter and η < 1 is the CES parameter. This implies that the production
technology of South takes the form of the standard Cobb-Douglas
yS = ASk
α
Sn
1−α
S , (14)
while the production technology of North takes the form of a nested Cobb-Douglas production
function with the CES-nest for the labour input
yN = ANk
α
N
[
(1− λ)nηN + λmη
](1−α)/η
, (15)
where the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor inputs, i.e. migrant and
native workers, is equal to σ ≡ 1/ (1− η).
2.3.1 Southern firms
In South, firms rent capital from the local households and hire workers on a frictional labor
market. In doing so, they open vacancies in response to expected profits. Each vacancy costs
the firm γS > 0 and matches with a worker at the rate q (θS), where θS is taken as given by
the firm. Consequently, denoting the separation rate of Southern employment by δS , the time
evolution of employment in South can be described by the following
n˙S = q (θS) vS − δSnS , (16)
Given an initial level of local employment nS (0), Southern firms’ objective is to choose paths
for nS and kS to maximize the present value of expected future cash-flows
VS (0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 rS(ω)dωpiSdt, (17)
subject to the dynamic equation (16) and
piS = ASk
α
Sn
1−α
S − rSkS − wSnS − γSvS . (18)
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Denoting the costate variable for nS by ξS , the necessary and sufficient conditions for an
optimum are given by
ξS =
γS
q (θS)
(19a)
rS = ASα
(
kS
nS
)−(1−α)
(19b)
ξ˙S = (rS + δS) ξS −
[
AS (1− α)
(
kS
nS
)α
− wS
]
, (19c)
where (19a) and (19b) are the optimality conditions for posting vacancies and renting capital,
and (19c) is a dynamic equation governing the time evolution of the shadow price ξS . The term
in square brackets on the right-hand side of (19c) is particularly important for the development
of the remaining parts of the model because it captures the firm’s share of the quasi-rent
generated by a job match. Consequently, in the remainder of the chapter we will denote it as
4fS ≡ AS (1− α) (kS/nS)α − wS . (20)
Equations (19a) and (19c) can be used to obtain a dynamic law governing the conditions
of the labor market. Indeed, combining (19a) and (19c), and then using (4) to substitute for
q (θS), we get
θ˙S =
(
θS
1− 
)[
rS + δS − 4
f
S
γS
z¯Sθ
−(1−)
S
]
, (21)
Dynamic equation (21) is one of key equations of the model. It governs the dynamics of
labor market tightness, θS , and characterizes the labor market conditions of South.
2.3.2 Northern firms
Similarly to South, Northern firms rent capital from households and hire workers on a frictional
labor market. In doing so, they open vacancies in response to expected profits, each of which
costs the firm γN > 0 and matches with a worker at the rate q (θN ). Since all job searchers - i.e.
native and immigrant unemployed workers - compete for the same vacancies vN , the probability
that a vacancy is matched with a worker of either the type “N” or “M” depends on the relative
abundance of each labor type in the economy.
Let ψ ≡ sN/ (φsM + sN ) denote the relative abundance of native workers in the unemploy-
ment pool. For any given ψ, the probability that the vacancy is filled with the native worker is
given by q (θ)ψ, so that, at each moment of time, the motion of native employment in North is
governed by
n˙N = q (θN )ψvN − δNnN , (22)
where δN is the separation rate of Northern employment.
Likewise, the probability that the vacancy is matched with an immigrant worker is given by
q (θS) (1− ψ), while the time evolution of the immigrant employment is driven by
m˙ = q (θN ) (1− ψ)vN − δNm, (23)
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where 1 − ψ = φsM/ (φsM + sN ) captures the relative abundance of native workers in the
unemployment pool of North.
Given a pair of initial conditions for native and immigrant employment, nN (0) and m (0),
the objective of the representative firm of North is to choose paths for nN , kN and m to maximize
VN (0) =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ h
t rN (ω)dωpiNdh, (24)
subject to (22), (23), and
piN = ANk
α
N
[
(1− λ)nηN + λmη
](1−α)/η − rNkN − wNnN − wMm− γNvN . (25)
Denoting the shadow prices of nN and m by, respectively, ξN and ξM , the maximization
entails the following set of first-order conditions
ξM + ψ (ξN − ξM ) = γN
q (θN )
(26a)
rN = αANk
α−1
N [(1− λ)nηN + λmη](1−α)/η (26b)
ξ˙N = (rN + δN ) ξN −
{
(1− α) (1− λ)ANkαN [(1− λ)nηN + λmη]
1−α−η
η nη−1N − wN
}
(26c)
ξ˙M = (rN + δN ) ξM −
{
(1− α)λANkαN [(1− λ)nηN + λmη]
1−α−η
η mη−1 − wM
}
, (26d)
where the first two equations (26a) and (26b) are the optimality conditions for posting vacancies
and renting capital, and the two differential equations (26c) and (26d) are the two dynamic laws
governing the time evolution of the shadow prices ξN and ξM . The two terms in curly brackets
on the right-hand sides of (26c) and (26d) indicate the Northern firm’s shares of the quasi-rent
generated by the hiring of, respectively, a native and an immigrant worker, and are henceforth
denoted by
4fN ≡ (1− α)ANkαN
[
(1− λ)nηN + λmη
](1−α−η)/η
(1− λ)nη−1N − wN (27)
4fM ≡ (1− α)ANkαN
[
(1− λ)nηN + λmη
](1−α−η)/η
λmη−1 − wM . (28)
To obtain the dynamic equation governing the time path of θN , we proceed as follows. First,
we define Ω ≡ ξN − ξM , such that Ω˙ ≡ ξ˙N − ξ˙M , and thus - via (26c) and (26d)
Ω˙ ≡ (rN + δN ) Ω +4fM −4fN . (29)
The variable Ω is a new endogenous variable to be determined in the equilibrium. It is equal
the spread between the shadow price of native and immigrant employment and is thought to
capture the relative convenience to hire an immigrant worker rather than a native worker.
Given Ω and its dynamic law (29), the next step consists in determining the dynamic law
of θN . To do that, we time-differentiate (26a), and then use (8), (26c) and (26d) to substitute
for q (θN ), ξ˙N and ξ˙M . This gives the following dynamic equation for θN
θ˙N =
(
θN
1− 
){
rN + δN −
[
ψ˙Ω− ψ4fN + (1− ψ)4fM
γN
]
z¯Nθ
−(1−)
N
}
, (30)
Equations (29) and (30) are other two key equations of the model.
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2.4 Remittances
In this chapter, both employed and unemployed immigrants remit part of their disposable
income to their countries of origin.
Consider first the case of an employed immigrant worker that works at the current wage rate
wM and pays the lump-sum tax τN .At each moment of time, the worker saves a fraction of her
income equal to the difference between the current disposable income, wM−τN , and consumption
expenditure cS . Hence, since the number of employed immigrants is equal to m, the aggregate
flow of remittances coming from this type of immigrant worker is RE = (wM − τN − cS)m.
Consider now the case of an unemployed immigrant worker receiving the unemployment
benefit bM and paying the lump-sum tax τN . Similarly to the case of the Southern worker,
her flow of remittances equates forgone consumption and can thus be written as the difference
between disposable income, bM − τN , and consumption expenditure cS . Because only φsM
units of Southern individuals reside in North as unemployed workers, the aggregate flow of
remittances coming from this other type of immigrant worker is RU = (bM − τN − cS)φsM .
Thus, by summing RE and RU , the overall flow of remittances moving from North to South
at any moment of time is given by
R ≡ RE +RU = wMm+ bMφsM − (τN + cS) (m+ φsM ) . (31)
2.5 Wage determination
In both countries, job matches generate economic quasi-rents and wages are set to share these
quasi-rents through a wage Nash bargaining process. We assume that, in each country i, the
bargained wage is the solution of the following maximization problem
wi = arg max
(
4hi
)χ (4fi )1−χ , χ ∈ (0, 1) ,
where χ is the bargaining strength of workers, and 4hi and 4fi are the share of the match
quasi-rent that go, respectively, to workers and firms.
In South, the joint value of the match is equal to the difference between the marginal
productivity of labor, ∂yS/∂nS , and the outside option of the Southern workers bS . The share
of the quasi-rent of firms, 4fS , is given by (20), while the share of workers can be obtained from
the distribution rule 4hS +4fS = ∂yS/∂nS − bS , and reads
4hS = wS − bS . (32)
Thus, using (20) and (32) to substitute for 4hS and 4fS in the above Nash bargaining
program, and then solving the maximization for the bargained wage yields
wS =
χAS (1− α)
(
kS
nS
)α
1− (1− χ)µS , (33)
where µS ∈ (0, 1) denotes the replacement rate in South, so that bS ≡ µSwS .
In North, the total value of the quasi-rent generated by a match depends on the type of
the matched workers. In the case of a native worker, it is given by the difference between the
10
marginal productivity of native labor, ∂yN/∂nN , and the outside option of native workers bN ,
while in the case of an immigrant worker, it is given by the difference between the marginal
productivity of immigrant labor, ∂yN/∂m, and the outside option of immigrant workers bM .
Similarly to the case of the Southern economy, the shares of the quasi-rents that go to Northern
firms are given by (27) and (28), while those that go to native and immigrant workers are
determined from the two distribution rules 4hN + 4fN = ∂yN/∂nN − bN and 4hM + 4fM =
∂yN/∂m− bM . Indeed, solving these two equations for 4hN and 4hM and then substituting for
4fN and 4fM from (27) and (28), we obtain the following expressions
4hN = wN − bN , 4hM = wN − bM . (34)
Plugging (27), (28) and (34), and then solving the resulting Nash bargaining problem for
the two bargained wages of Northern and immigrant workers gives the following expressions
wN =
χ (1− α)ANkαN [(1− λ)nηN + λmη]
1−α−η
η (1− λ)nη−1N
1− (1− χ)µN (35)
wM =
χ (1− α)ANkαN [(1− λ)nηN + λmη]
1−α−η
η λmη−1
1− (1− χ)µN , (36)
where bj ≡ µNwj , and µN ∈ (0, 1) is the replacement rate in North.
2.6 Governments
In this chapter, each local government is assumed to run a balanced-budget policy, in which
social welfare expenditures are balanced by levying lump-sum taxes on the resident population.
From (1), it follows that the number of workers that currently reside in South and pay the
lump-sum tax τS is LS = 1 −m − φsM , of which (1 − φ)sM of them are unemployed workers
that receive the unemployment benefit µSwS from the government. Accordingly, the Southern
government’s budget constraint can be written as
τS(1−m− φsM ) = µSwS(1− φ)sM . (37)
Similarly, from (1), it follows that the number of individuals, both natives and immigrants, that
currently reside in North and pay the lump-sum tax τN is LN = 1 + m + φsM , of which sN
natives and φsM immigrants are currently unemployed workers receiving financial support from
the Northern government. Thus, government’s budget constraint in North can be written as
τN (1 +m+ φsM ) = µNsNwN + µNwMφsM . (38)
Equations (37) and (38) complete the description of the model.
2.7 The steady-state equilibrium
In this section, we solve the model for the steady-state equilibrium. The general equilibrium of
the model is characterized by a set of ten differential equations governing the long-run dynamics
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of the aggregate economy, and ten static equations establishing equilibrium relationships and
prices.
The dynamic equations of the model are: the two Euler conditions for consumption (12)
and (13); the two flow budget constraints of households, (10) and (11); the five dynamic laws
for domestic employments, (16), (22) and (23), and labor market tightness, (21) and (30); the
auxiliary costate variable capturing the relative shadow price of Northern employment, (29).
The ten static equations of the model are referred to: the resource constraints for all of the
labor inputs, (1) and (5), the flow of remittances of immigrants (31), the ongoing levels of the
interest rates and wages, (19b), (26b), (33), (35) and (36), and the balanced-budget rules of
local governments (37) and (38).
In any steady-state equilibrium, consumption per capita, cS and cN , capital stocks, kS and
kN , employments, nS , nN and m, labor market tightness, θS and θN , and the relative shadow
price of Northern employment, Ω, are constant over time, as well as the flow of remittances,
R, and input prices rS , rN , wS , wS and wM . Formally, this means that, at each moment of
time, it must be that c˙S = k˙S = n˙S = m˙ = θ˙S = c˙N = k˙N = n˙N = θ˙N = Ω˙ = 0, such that
the steady-state values of all of the aforementioned endogenous variables, denoted by “ˆ”, are
defined by a set of thirteen steady-state conditions. Below we characterize the steady state
system of the model.
We begin with the Euler conditions (12) and (13). In the steady-state, the domestic interest
rates equate the marginal product of capital. Thus, we plug (19b) and (26b) into (12) and (13)
yields
ASα
(
kˆS
nˆS
)−(1−α)
= ρ (SS1)
αAN kˆ
α−1
N
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
](1−α)/η
= ρ. (SS2)
The resource constraints of households are given by the flow budget constraints (10) and (11).
Substituting for piS and piN from (18) and (25), and then using (33), (35) and (36) to substitute
for wS , wN and wM , we obtain
AS kˆ
α
S nˆ
1−α
S
{
1 +
µSχ (1− α) (1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ)
[1− (1− χ)µS ] nˆS
}
+ Rˆ =
= γS θˆS (1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ) + (cˆS + τS) [1− mˆ− φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] (SS3)
γN θˆN [1− nˆN + φ (1− nˆN − mˆ)] + (cˆN + τˆN ) = AN kˆαN
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
] 1−α
η ×
×
1 + χ (1− α)
[
µN (1− λ) nˆη−1N (1− nˆN − mˆ)− λmˆη
]
[1− (1− χ)µN ]
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
]
 , (SS4)
where, in order to obtain (SS3) and (SS4), the relationships bS = µSwS , bN = µNwN , vS =
θS (1− φ) (1− nS −m) and vN = θN [1− nN + φ (1− nN −m)] have been used.
The equilibrium flows of remittances, Rˆ, and lump-sum taxes τˆS and τˆN appearing in (SS3)
and (SS4) are determined by (31), (37) and (38). Using (1), (5), (33), (35) and (36) to substitute
for sN , sM , wS , wN and wM in (31), (37) and (38) and recalling that in this model bM = µNwM ,
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yields
Rˆ = [mˆ+ µNφ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] χ (1− α)AN kˆ
α
N [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η λmˆη−1
1− (1− χ)µN −
− (τˆN + cˆS) [mˆ+ φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] (SS5)
τˆS [1− mˆ− φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] = µS χAS (1− α) (1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ)
1− (1− χ)µS
(
kˆS
nˆS
)α
(SS6)
τˆN [1 + mˆ+ φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] = µNχ (1− α)AN kˆαN [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η ×
×
{
(1− nˆN ) (1− λ) nˆη−1N + φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)λmˆη−1
1− (1− χ)µN
}
. (SS7)
The time evolution of domestic employments is given by the dynamic equations (16), (22) and
(23), while the conditions of the local labor markets are determined by (21) and (30). We begin
by focusing on the steady-state conditions determining the values of domestic employments:
nˆS , nˆN and mˆ.
Using (4) and (8) to substitute for the job finding rates q (θS) and q (θN ) from the right-
hand sides of (16), (22) and (23), and recalling that ψ = (1− nN ) / [1− nN + φ (1− nN −m)],
vS = θS (1− φ) (1− nS −m) and vN = θN [1− nN + φ (1− nN −m)], we obtain the following
triplet of steady-state conditions for native and migrant employments
(1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ) z¯S θˆS = δSnˆS (SS8)
(1− nˆN ) z¯N θˆN = δN nˆN (SS9)
φ (1− nˆN − mˆ) z¯N θˆN = δNmˆ. (SS10)
Next, we turn to the labor-market tightness relationships (21) and (30). Recall that in the
steady-state ψ˙ = 0. Thus, to obtain the steady-state conditions associated to (21) and (30) we
proceed as follows. Firstly, we plug (33), (35) and (36) into the shares of quasi-rents of firms
(20),(27) and (28). Then, we use the resulting expressions to substitutes for ∆fS , ∆
f
N and ∆
f
M
in (21) and (30). Finally, we substitute for rS and rN from the right-hand sides of (21) and
(30) by using first-order conditions (19b) and (26b). The result is
αAS
(
kˆS
nˆS
)−(1−α)
+ δS = (1− α)AS
(
kˆS
nˆS
)α
1− (1− χ)µS − χ
γS [1− (1− χ)µS ] z¯S θˆ
−(1−)
S (SS11)
αAN kˆ
α−1
N
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
](1−α)/η
+ δN = (1− α)AN kˆαN
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
] 1−α−η
η ×
×
(1− χ) (1− µN )
[
(1− nˆN ) (1− λ)nˆη−1N + φ (1− nˆN − mˆ)λmˆη−1
]
γN [1− (1− χ)µN ] [1− nˆN + φ (1− nˆN − mˆ)]
 z¯N θˆ−1N , (SS12)
where, to obtain (SS11) and (SS12), we used ψ = (1− nN ) / [1− nN + φ (1− nN −m)] .
Finally, setting the steady-state condition Ω˙ = 0 to the auxiliary costate variable in equation
(29), then using (26b) to substitute for the Northern interest rate, and equations (20), (27),
(28), (33), (35) and (36) to substitute for all of firms’ quasi-rent shares, ∆fS , ∆
f
N and ∆
f
M , and
wage rates, wS , wN and wM , we obtain the following steady-state condition for the auxiliary
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costate variable
Ωˆ =
(1− α)AN kˆαN
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
] 1−α−η
η{
αAN kˆ
α−1
N
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
](1−α)/η
+ δN
}×
×
(1− χ) (1− µN )
[
(1− λ)nˆη−1N − λmˆη−1
]
γN [1− (1− χ)µN ]
 . (SS13)
Equations (SS1)-(SS13) form a system of thirteen equations in thirteen unknowns: cˆS , cˆN , kˆS ,
kˆN , Rˆ, τˆS , τˆN , nˆS , nˆN , mˆ, θˆS , θˆN , and Ωˆ.
Proposition 1 The model always predicts a unique, economically meaningful steady-state equi-
librium with positive migration.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Armed with this result, in the next section we will calibrate our model for the case of the
U.S. economy and analyze the steady-state effects of a permanent increase in Southern workers
looking for a job in North.
3 Rising migration effort in South
In the previous section, we have solved the model for the steady-state equilibrium and have
demonstrated that the equilibrium with positive labor migration always exists and is unique.
In what follows we explore the impact of an increase in migration flows by shocking the share
of Southern unemployed members looking for a job in North, φ.4 Due to the complexity of the
model, we will perform this analysis through a simulation exercise. In doing so, we will take the
period of the model to correspond to one quarter and calibrate all the exogenous parameters in
order to match (i) the key statistics for the U.S. economy during the period 2007–2017; (ii) the
recent empirical findings in the fields of international macroeconomics and international labor
mobility.
3.1 Parametrization
Table 1 shows the benchmark values for all the calibrated parameters. Following Siegel (2002),
we set the subjective discount rate ρ to 0.01, so that the annual interest rate is roughly 4%.
Further, we choose the capital share parameter α = 0.33 to match the empirical evidence
of Gollin (2002). Hendricks (2002) finds – using data on immigrants earnings – that TFP
contributes for a factor of 3 in explaining output per worker disparities between U.S. and low-
income countries. For this reason, in the simulations we set AS = 1 and AN = 3.
4Several determinants may induce an increase in search effort for a job abroad – even exogenous ones, such
as the erosion of political order recently experienced by a number of sending countries.
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Parameter Description Value
ρ Subjective discount rate 0.01
AS TFP of South 1
AN TFP of North 3
α Capital share 0.33
σ Substitution elasticity 20
λ Productivity share 0.4206
φ Share of Southern unemployed in North 0.2087
 Matching elasticity 0.5
χ Worker bargaining power 0.5
δS Southern separation rate 0.0475
δN Northern separation rate 0.0488
γS Southern vacancy cost 26.634
γN Northern vacancy cost 74.235
z¯S Southern matching efficiency 1
z¯N Northern matching efficiency 1
µS Southern replacement rate 0.31
µN Northern replacement rate 0.62
Table 1: Benchmark parametrization of the model.
Recalling that σ ≡ 1/ (1− η), our choice of η is consistent with Ottaviano and Peri (2012),
who find an elasticity of substitution between U.S. natives and immigrants with similar educa-
tion and experience levels of 20. The share parameter λ = 0.4206 is thus chosen to match the
wage ratio between native and migrant workers of 1.253 over the decade 2007-2017.5
As top sender countries are characterized by a lower unemployment rate than the U.S.
during the considered period, we set the separation rates δS = 0.0475 and δN = 0.0488 so to
match, respectively, the Mexico and U.S. unemployment rates of about 4.5% and 6.7%.6 The
share of Southern workers looking for a job abroad, φ, is instead set to match the equilibrium
share of immigrant workers out of the total workforce in North close to the 13% of immigrant
workers residing in U.S. over the period 2007-2017.7 As far as the fiscal component is concerned,
the Northern replacement rate µN is set to 0.62, soas to match the short-term unemployment
5Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
6We take Mexico unemployment rate for reference as top sender country. The other top sender countries,
namely China, India, and Philippines, have a similarly low unemployment rate of 4.4%, 3.6 and 3.4%, respectively.
Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database.
7Source: America Community Survey (ACS) data.
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benefits that single workers in the U.S. receive after loosing a job.8 Because sending countries
tend to have a far lower unemployment benefit coverage, we set the Southern replacement rate
µS to 0.31, so that µN is twice as high as µS .
9
Following the bulk of the literature on search and matching, we set the matching function
parameter  to 0.5 so as to allow it to fall within the range of estimates reported by Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), and the worker bargaining power
χ to 0.5, so as to meet the so-called Hosios condition (see Hosios, 1990). Further, we set the
Southern vacancy cost to 26.634 so to obtain a Southern market tightness equal to one (i.e., as
in Shimer, 2005, the worker finding rate is equal to the job finding rate), while the Northern
vacancy cost is set to 74.235, coherently with U.S. market tightness of about 0.45.10 Finally,
we normalize the matching parameters z¯S and z¯N to one for simplicity.
Armed with the parametrization displayed in Table 1, in the next two sections we will
evaluate the long-run effects of a 10% permanent increase in the share of Southern searchers
looking for a job in North. We begin by assessing the macroeconomic effects of rising migration
worldwide. Next, we turn to analyze the long-run impact on national welfare in both North
and South.
3.2 The macroeconomic effects
Suppose both economies are in their own steady-state and suppose that at t = 0 an exogenous
shock causes the share of search effort abroad φ to raise permanently by 10%. Table 2 shows
the results of the comparative statics analysis.11
We begin from the Northern economy. In North, a permanent increase in the share of
Southern searchers abroad, φ, makes immigrant employment in North, m, increase. This affects
the economy in three different ways. Firstly, the rise in m increases the supply for labor in North
and causes the marginal product of capital to deviate temporarily from its steady-state level, ρ.
That causes firms to respond positively to the consequent increase in the marginal product of
capital by spurring investment and capital accumulation until the marginal productivity equates
the interest rate in the new steady state. Eventually, the increase in capital input (+1.11%),
along with the increase in labor input, lead to a higher level of per capita output (+1.11%) and
profits (+1.11%), and thus to higher per capita consumption in North (+0.54%).
Secondly, the rise in φ generates a slight displacement effect in the Northern labor market
that hurts native employment. As both migrants and natives compete for the same vacancies,
the increase in migration flows eventually lowers the amount of the employed natives (-0.02%),
and increases that of the employed migrants (+10.59%). However, since competition between
8Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models
9In Appendix B we show a sensitivity analysis for different values of µS .
10Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
11As described in Section 2, in the model there are ten endogenous variables. Five of those are predetermined
variables, and five are control variables. The Jacobian matrix of the linearized system evaluated around the
steady-state possess five stable eigenvalues and five unstable ones, thus the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are met
and the unique steady-state equilibrium is saddle-path stable (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
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South North
Variable Initial Final Variation Initial Final Variation
ci 4.3919 4.1444 0.51% 13.567 13.64 0.54%
ki 149.85 147.04 -1.87% 562.84 569.118 1.11 %
ni 0.8114 0.7962 -1.87% 0.9323 0.9322 -0.02%
m n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.134 0.1548 10.59%
θi 1 1 0% 0.452 0.4498 -0.5%
yi 4.5408 4.4558 -1.87% 17.056 17.246 1.11%
wi 2.2188 2.2188 0% 7.9316 7.9361 0.06%
wm n.a n.a. n.a. 6.329 6.3011 -0.45%
Πi 0.2161 0.2121 -1.87% 0.5352 0.5411 1.11%
R 0.2178 0.2325 6.76% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 2: The steady-state effects of a 10% raising in migration effort – Comparative statics
results.
workers intensifies due to the increase in the search effort coming from South, market tightness
in North decreases in the post-shock equilibrium (-0.5%), implying a lower job-finding rate,
p(θN ), and a higher unemployment rate (+0.23%) for all Northern workers.
Lastly, a positive migration shock has asymmetric impacts on wages. Since migrants and
natives are imperfect substitutes in production, the rise in the inflow of migrant workers in-
creases competition among foreign-born workers, and decreases that among native workers.
For this reason, the wage paid to migrant workers decreases (-0.45%), whereas the wage rate
paid to domestic workers slightly increases (+0.06%). This completes the description of the
macroeconomic effects in North of rising migration effort in South.
Consider now the Southern economy. Differently from North, in South the ultimate effect
of a permanent rise in φ is to slim the local workforce and employment because of emigration.
Southern firms respond to the fall in labor supply by reducing investment and shrinking the
steady-state level of capital per worker (-1.87%). Consequently, in the post-shock steady-state
equilibrium, per capita output, yS , and profits, piS , decrease permanently.
Interestingly, the fall in per capita income is not accompanied by a fall in consumption.
As shown by Table 2, even though all the main macroeconomic variables of South experience
a contraction, per capita consumption, cS , shows a slight increase (+0.51%) because of the
increase in remittances (+6.76% overall) due to the increase in emigration rate. In fact, since
southern workers pool their income together regardless of their location, the increase in mi-
gration translates into a higher consumption for all Southern household’s members around the
world.
Curiously enough, despite the fall in labor supply due to emigration, in the long run the
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equilibrium wage rate of South does not change because of the shock. Such a finding is due to the
interplay between the upward pressure coming from the reduced labor supply, and the downward
pressure coming from lower capital accumulation. Eventually, the two effects compensate one
another, thereby leading to no change in Southern wages in the post-shock equilibrium.
3.3 Welfare analysis
Once assessed the steady-state effects of migration on the main macroeconomic variables of the
model, it is now time to restrict our attention to analyzing the long-run effects on consumer
welfare. In doing so, we keep assuming that the global economy is in its own steady-state
equilibrium and that, at t = 0, a shock causes the shock parameter φ to raise permanently by
10%.
From equation (9), we obtain the following indirect utility function we use as welfare index
Wi = log (cˆi)
ρ
,
which is a function of steady-state consumption cˆi.
As the steady-state consumption cˆi depends on all the other steady-state variables of our
model, an increase in φ generates an ambiguous impact on the households welfare that cannot
be determined without a quantitative analysis. Our simulations show that the Southern welfare
gain is around 0.35%, while the Northern welfare gain is about 0.2% (cf. Table 3).
South North
Variable Initial Final Variation Initial Final Variation
ci 4.3919 4.1444 0.51% 13.567 13.64 0.54%
Wi 147.98 148.49 0.35% 260.77 261.3 0.2 %
Table 3: Steady-state impact of migration on welfare.
This means that both households experience a welfare gain from an increased Southern
search effort in North, though the Southern household gains relatively more than the Northern
one.
4 Extension
In the baseline model of Section 2, central governments played no role in governing the process
of labor migration. In this section, we extend the baseline model by assuming the existence
of a protectionist government in North that wants to discourage domestic firms from hiring
migrant workers through the imposing of a positive tax rate on immigrant employment. The
main objective of the section is thus to study to what extent protectionist policies can be useful
in improving employment opportunity for natives and rise national welfare.
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We start by plugging the interventionist policy into the formal framework developed in
Section 2. Then, we characterize the search equilibrium of the extended model and perform
some comparative statics exercises for the case in which the Northern government introduces a
10 percent distortionary tax rate on domestic firms.
4.1 The search equilibrium with a protectionist government in North
Formally, the model is identical to that presented in the previous section except for the presence
of a tax on foreign employment. Let τF ∈ [0, 1) denote the tax rate on foreign employment in
North. The new Northern government balance reads
τN (1 +m+ φsM ) + τFwMm = µN (sNwN + φsMwM ) , (39)
where the left-hand side, i.e. (the government revenues), also includes the new term τFwMm,
which indicates the amount of profits drained out from Northern firms that employ immigrant
workers.
Households’ preferences and firms’ technologies are identical to those presented in Section
2. Consequently, no changes take places in the utility maximization problems of the Southern
and Northern representative household, as well as in the profit maximization problem of the
representative firm in South. However, the profit maximization of Northern producers changes
to include the positive tax rate on foreign employment. In particular, because of the tax rate,
the labor cost associated to each immigrant worker rises to (1 + τF )wM , so the cash flow of the
representative firm becomes
VN (0) =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ h
t rN (ω)dω [yN − rNkN − wNnN − (1 + τF )wMm− γvN ] dh. (40)
The firm chooses quantities of vN , kN , m and nN to maximize the (40) subject to the
production technology (15) and the dynamic equations governing native and immigrant em-
ployment, (22) and (23). Using the same optimization methods employed to solve the dynamic
problem of Section 2.3.2, we obtain the same first-orders conditions for vN , kN and nN , but a
different one for m, which reads
ξ˙M = (rN + δN ) ξM −∆fM , (41)
where the quasi-rent going to the representative Northern producer, ∆fM , in the presence of the
distortionary tax is given by
∆fM ≡ (1− α)λANkαN [(1− λ)nηN + λmη]
1−α−η
η mη−1 − (1 + τF )wM , (42)
Using (42) to substitute for ∆fM in the Nash bargaining problem of Section 2.5, we obtain
the following expression for the bargained wage rate of the immigrant workers
wM =
χ (1− α)λANkαN [(1− λ)nηN + λmη]
1−α−η
η mη−1
χτF + 1− (1− χ)µN , (43)
which is decreasing in the new distortionary tax, τF , imposed by the government.
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The dynamic and static equations of the extended model only differ from the benchmark
model for the Northern firm surplus of hiring a migrant worker, which is now determined by
equation (42), and by the new equation that determines the wage rate of immigrants (36).
Overall, compared with the steady-state system of the baseline model of 2, the stationary
conditions for variables kˆS , kˆN , τˆS , nˆS , nˆN , mˆ and θˆS do not change because of the protectionist
government of North,12 while the stationary conditions for the remaining endogenous variables
cˆS , cˆN , Rˆ, τˆN , θˆN and Ωˆ do change considerably and have to be determined accordingly.
In fact, by making use of the same proceeding described in Section 2.7, it can be shown that
the following steady-state equations hold for, respectively, households consumption, cˆS and cˆN ,
AS kˆ
α
S nˆ
1−α
S
{
1 +
µSχ (1− α) (1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ)
[1− (1− χ)µS ] nˆS
}
+ Rˆ =
= γS θˆS (1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ) + (cˆS + τˆS) [1− mˆ− φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] (SS3.1)
γN θˆN [1− nˆN + φ (1− nˆN − mˆ)] + (cˆN + τˆN ) = AN kˆαN
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
] 1−α
η {1 +
+
χ (1− α)
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
[
µN (1− λ) nˆη−1N (1− nˆN − mˆ)
1− (1− χ)µN −
λmˆη
χτF + 1− (1− χ)µN
]}
, (SS4.1)
remittances, Rˆ, and Northern lump-sum tax, τˆN
Rˆ = [mˆ+ µNφ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] χ (1− α)AN kˆ
α
N [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η λmˆη−1
χτF + 1− (1− χ)µN −
− (τˆN + cˆS) [mˆ+ φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] (SS5.1)
τN [1 + mˆ+ φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] = µNχ (1− α)AN kˆαN [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η ×
×
{
(1− nˆN ) (1− λ) nˆη−1N
1− (1− χ)µN +
φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)λmˆη−1
χτF + 1− (1− χ)µN
}
. (SS7.1)
Similarly, the steady-state equation for the labor market tightness of North changes, as the
profitability of firms from migrant employment is affected by the distortionary tax τF . The
result is
αAN kˆ
α−1
N
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
](1−α)/η
+ δN = (1− α)AN kˆαN
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
] 1−α−η
η ×{
(1− χ) (1− µN ) (1− nˆN ) (1− λ)nˆη−1N
γN [1− (1− χ)µN ] [1− nˆN + φ (1− nˆN − mˆ)] +
+
[χ (τF − 1) + 1− (1− χ)µN ]φ (1− nˆN − mˆ)λmˆη−1
γN [χτF + 1− (1− χ)µN ] [1− nˆN + φ (1− nˆN − mˆ)]
}
z¯N θˆ
−(1−)
N . (SS12.1)
Finally, the steady-state equation for the auxiliary costate variable Ωˆ reads
Ωˆ =
(1− α)AN kˆαN
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
] 1−α−η
η{
αAN kˆ
α−1
N
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
](1−α)/η
+ δN
}×
×
{
(1− χ) (1− µN ) (1− λ)nˆη−1N
γN [1− (1− χ)µN ] −
[χ (τF − 1) + 1− (1− χ)µN ]λmˆη−1
γN [χτF + 1− (1− χ)µN ]
}
. (SS10.1)
12Namely, these conditions are (SS1), (SS2), (SS6), (SS8), (SS9), (SS10) and (SS11).
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This completes the description of the steady-state equilibrium of the extended version of
the model. In the next section, we will assess the steady-state effects of the immigration tax on
the same endogenous variables discussed in Section 3.
4.2 Taxing immigrant employment
Suppose that both economies are in their own steady-state equilibrium, and suppose that at
t = 0 the Northern government decides to lay a tax rate of 10% on the wage rate paid by
native employers to immigrant workers. Making use of the same parametrization adopted in the
baseline model, Table 5 reports the steady-state effects of the policy on the main macroeconomic
variables of the model.13
South North
Variable Initial Final Variation Initial Final Variation
ci 4.3919 4.339 -1.2% 13.567 13.627 0.44%
ki 149.85 150 0.1% 562.84 562.23 -0.11 %
ni 0.8114 0.8122 0.1% 0.9323 0.9319 -0.05%
m n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.134 0.1391 -0.61%
θi 1 1 0% 0.452 0.4456 -1.41%
yi 4.5408 4.5453 0.1% 17.056 17.037 -0.11%
wi 2.2188 2.2188 0% 7.9316 7.9314 -0.%
wm n.a n.a. n.a. 6.329 5.9032 -6.73%
Πi 0.2161 0.2163 0.1% 0.5352 0.5307 -0.83%
R 0.2178 0.173 -20.11% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Wi 147.98 146.76 -0.82% 260.77 261.2 0.17%
Table 4: The steady-state effects of a 10% tax on immigrant employment – Comparative
statics results.
In North, a 10 percent tax rate on immigrant wages affects the macroeconomic equilibrium
through two interlinked channels: labor market conditions and capital accumulation. First,
the introduction of the tax rate τF lowers Northern firms profitability (-0.83%) which, in turn,
open less job vacancies (i.e. the market tightness decreases by 1.41%), hurting not only migrant
employment (-0.61%), but also native one (-0.05%). Second, the overall fall in employment
caused by the tax on migration induces Northern firms to rent less capital (-0.11%) and reduce
production (-0.11%). This further result is due to the unitary elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor inputs displayed by the Cobb-Douglas type production technology (15) used
13As in the quantitative analysis of the baseline model, the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are met and the unique
steady-state equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
21
in North.
It is worth noticing how, despite of worsened labor market conditions, both native con-
sumption and welfare increase due to the lower lump-sum tax that Northern workers pay in
the post-shock steady-state (+0.44% and +0.17%, respectively). Indeed, taxing immigrant em-
ployment makes government revenues increase and, as a consequence, Northern government will
lower the lump-sum tax paid by all workers residing in North until the budget balances again.
In South, the imposing of a positive tax rate on foreign employment in North affects the
local macroeconomic equilibrium only indirectly through changes in the equilibrium flows of
migration and per capita remittances. Firstly, the cut in immigrant employment undertaken
in North significantly reduces the equilibrium wage rate of immigrant workers (-6.73%), and
discourages Northern firms from employing immigrants, thereby implying that in the post-
policy long-run equilibrium the share of household’s members participating to the Southern
labor market increases, making employment in South to raise by 0.11%. Secondly, increased
labor supply induces Southern firms to increase their demand for capital (+0.11%), temporary
speeding up the pace of capital accumulation and thus increasing production (+0.11%).
Curiously, Southern wage rates are not affected by the protectionist policy of North. Indeed,
according to Table 5, in the post-policy steady state wages do not experience any change in
their equilibrium levels because of the tax policy. Such a surprisingly result can be explained
through the interaction of two offsetting effects, in which the shift in the labor demand schedule
that positively affects wS works simultaneously together with the increase in the labor supply
that negatively affects wS for compensating with each other.
Finally, concerning remittances, Table 5 shows that the downward correction on migrant
wages generates a dramatic fall in remittances (-20.11%). Far from being harmless, the fall
in remittances heavily affects Southern welfare because of the permanent fall in per capita
consumption (-1.2%), which in turn causes the welfare index to decrease by 0.82%.
5 Sensitivity analysis on the elasticity of substitution
Because of the empirical disagreement on the degree of substitutability between immigrant and
native workers (see Borjas et al., 2012), in this section we perform a sensitivity analysis on the
elasticity of substitution between immigrant and native workers, σ. In these simulations we
account for parametrization of σ = (20, 50, 100, 1000) for both the baseline and the extended
model. Table 5 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis.
Even when considering the case with the highest degree of substitutability (σ = 1000), the
main results obtained in Section 3 and 4 hold unaffected, that is: (i) an increase in migration is
able to slightly displace native employment but, at the same time, increases Northern production
as well as welfare in both North and South; (ii) the imposition of a tax on firms hiring immigrant
workers fails to promote native employment, though it is able to increase native welfare at the
expense of capital accumulation and production.
This result underlines that our findings are robust to the assumption of imperfect substi-
tutability between immigrant and native workers. Indeed, all steady-state variations preserve
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Baseline Extension
Variable σ = 20 σ = 50 σ = 100 σ = 1000 σ = 20 σ = 50 σ = 100 σ = 1000
cN 0.54 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.41
cS 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.47 -1.2 -1.17 -1.15 -1.14
kN 1.11 1.06 1.04 1.02 -0.11 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
kS -1.87 -1.88 -1.88 -1.88 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.09
nN -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
nS -1.87 -1.88 -1.88 -1.88 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.09
m 10.59 10.52 10.5 10.49 -0.61 -0.58 -0.57 -0.56
θN -0.5 -0.6 -0.64 -0.67 -1.41 -1.34 -1.32 -1.3
θS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
YN 1.11 1.06 1.04 1.02 -0.11 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
YS -1.87 -1.88 -1.88 -1.88 0.1 0.09 0.09 -0.09
wN 0.06 0.02 0.01 0. -0. -0. -0. -0.
wM -0.45 -0.18 -0.09 -0. -6.73 -6.75 -6.75 -6.76
wS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ΠN 1.11 1.06 1.04 1.02 -0.83 -0.79 -0.77 -0.76
ΠS -1.87 -1.88 -1.88 -1.88 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.09
R 6.76 7.65 8.01 8.36 -20.11 -23.17 -24.24 -25.30
WN 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
WS 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.32 -0.82 -0.8 -0.79 -0.79
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis on σ – steady-state variations in percentage points.
the same sign as in the benchmark parametrization, with differences in magnitudes being over-
all very modest. In particular, higher parametrizations of σ translate in slightly less optimistic
post-shock variation for South and North in the benchmark version of our model. As the degree
of substitutability between immigrants and natives increases, firms profitability from employing
an additional immigrant decreases, so that capital accumulation and production decrease as
well. In the extreme case of σ → ∞, immigrant and native workers are perfect substitutes in
production, and an increase in migration flows produce the same wage effects for both native
and immigrant workers. That is why Table 5 shows that, as σ increases, variations on immigrant
and native wages converge to the same percentage, 0, in the benchmark version of our model.
As far as the extended version of the model is concerned, higher calibration values of σ
lead to less optimistic results for the North, but less pessimistic results for the South. This is
because, as Northern firms find optimal to employ less immigrant workers when σ is higher, the
protectionist policy turns out to benefit from a lower number of immigrants, thus generating a
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slightly lower welfare variations in both South and North.
6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have analyzed the macroeconomic and social welfare impacts of interna-
tional labor mobility through a two-country Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model with labor market
frictions and endogenous migration. In the model, workers have the opportunity to migrate
from a low-TFP South towards a high-TFP North. The structure of the model enables us
to (1) capture the effect of migration on the employment opportunities of native workers; (2)
endogenously take into account the migration decision made by foreign workers; (3) address
the role of remittances in consumption smoothing across the two economies. These aspects are
largely overlooked by the general-equilibrium literature on migration and growth, which tends
to abstract from employment issues and worker’s decision on migration and remittances.
The analysis shows that there always exists a unique steady-state equilibrium for the world
economy. In order to provide an assessment of the long-run impacts of a rise in migration
effort on a global scale, we have calibrated our two-country model and performed a numerical
simulation. Overall, our simulations generate three major findings. First, a permanent increase
in migration causes per capita income and capital accumulation to rise in North, and to fall in
South. Nonetheless, per capita consumption increases not only in the Northern country, but
also in the Southern country, where a higher overall flow of received remittances is the main
responsible for this result. Second, higher migration intensity spurs job competition in North,
and generates a slight “displacement effect” that harms native employment. This result is
consistent with what found by Card (2001) and Liu (2010), but in contrast with Ortega (2000),
Moreno-Galbis and Tritah (2016), and Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), who find that search
friction may explain a positive employment effect of immigrants on natives. Third, households
welfare is found to increase in both countries, with households welfare increasing relatively more
in the low-TFP than in the high-TFP economy.
In the second part of this chapter, we have developed an extended version of the model
in order to analyze to what extent a protectionist policy in North is able to support national
employment and welfare by imposing a distortionary tax on the domestic firms who hire foreign
workers in place of native ones. Our simulation shows that: on the one hand, this policy fails to
promote native employment in North, damaging employers profitability who, as a consequence,
post less job vacancies for both immigrants and natives, reducing capital accumulation and
production as a consequence; on the other hand, the protectionist policy is able to slightly in-
crease native consumption by redistributing the additional government revenues to unemployed
workers in North.
We further perform a sensitivity analysis and find that, for both versions of the model,
our results are robust across different degrees of substitutability between migrant and native
workers.
Our analysis can be extended to address several issues for future research. One significant
issue to be pursued in future work is to allow for endogenous growth. A number of studies
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have included migration flows in endogenous growth models, notably considering the role of
immigrants on technological progress and their contribution to innovation (see, e.g., Lundborg
and Segerstrom, 2000; Kim et al., 2010; Levine et al., 2010). However, these studies rely on
the assumption of full employment labor markets, leaving potential interdependence concerns
between labor market conditions and growth dynamics thus far unexplored. Another interesting
issue to be considered is to extend our model for financial integration across the two economies.
As empirical research suggests, migration may spur bilateral trade through a number of channels
and, in turn, differently affect the relationship between migration and growth dynamics.
25
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix provides the formal demonstration of the existence and unicity of the steady-state
equilibrium of the model described in Section 2. To soften the notational burden, in what follows
we adopt the following collection of given parameters: ΨS ≡ (αAS/ρ)
1
1−α , ΨN ≡ (αAN/ρ)
1
1−α ,
ΦS ≡ (1− φ) z¯SδN and ΦN ≡ φz¯NδS .
The system (SS1)-(SS13) used to solve the steady-state equilibrium of the model has a
recursive structure. First, equations (SS1), (SS2), (SS8), (SS9) and (SS10) can be solved simul-
taneously for kˆS , kˆN , nˆS , nˆN and mˆ to get the following five steady-state conditions
kˆS =
ΨSΦS θˆ

S
δSδN + ΦN θˆN + ΦS θˆ

S
≡ kˆS(θˆS , θˆN ) (A1)
kˆN = ΨN
[
λ
(
ΦN θˆ

N
ΦN θˆN + δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)η
+ (1− λ)
(
z¯N θˆ

N
δN + z¯N θˆN
)η] 1η
≡ kN (θˆS , θˆN ) (A2)
nˆS =
ΦS θˆ

S
δSδN + ΦNθN + ΦS θˆ

S
≡ nˆS(θˆS , θˆN ) (A3)
nˆN =
z¯N θˆ

N
δN + z¯N θˆN
≡ nˆN (θˆN ) (A4)
mˆ =
(
ΦN θˆ

N
ΦN θˆN + δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
≡ mˆ(θˆS , θˆN ). (A5)
Next plugging kˆS(θˆS , θˆN ), kˆN (θˆS , θˆN ), nˆS(θˆS , θˆN ) and mˆ(θˆS , θˆN ) into equation (SS11), after
heavy simplification, we obtain the steady-state value for the Southern labor market tightness
θˆS =
{
(1− α)(1− χ)AS (1− µS) z¯SΨαS
γS [1− µS (1− χ)]
(
αASΨ
α−1
S + δS
)} 11− . (A6)
Based on functions (A1)-(A5), we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 kˆS(θˆN ), kˆn(θˆN ), nˆS(θˆN ), nˆN (θˆN ) and mˆ(θˆN ) are positive-valued functions for
any θˆN ∈ (0,∞). Moreover, kS(θˆN ) and nS(θˆN ) are monotonically decreasing, while kN (θˆN ),
nn(θˆN ) and m(θˆN ) are monotonically increasing and concave.
Proof. It is easy to check that, since all parameters are positive, and the restrictions
λ ∈ (0, 1), µS ∈ (0, 1), α ∈ (0, 1) and χ ∈ (0, 1) apply, functions (A1)-(A5) and equation
(A6) determine positive steady-state values for any θˆN ∈ (0,∞). Moreover, taking the partial
derivative of (A1) and (A3) with respect to θˆN yields
kˆ′S(θˆN ) = −
ΦNΦSΨS θˆ
−1
N θ

S(
δNδS + ΦN θˆN + ΦS θˆ

S
)
2
< 0
nˆ′S(θˆN ) = −
ΦNΦS θˆ
−1
N θˆ

S(
δNδS + ΦN θˆN + ΦS θˆ

S
)
2
< 0,
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where θˆS is a positive collection of parameters determined by equation (A6). Taking the first
and second derivatives of (A2) and (A4), and recalling that  ∈ (0, 1), we obtain
nˆ′N (θˆN ) =
δN z¯N θˆ
−1
N(
δN + z¯N θˆN
)2 > 0
nˆ′′N (θˆN ) =
δN z¯N θˆ
−2
N
[
(− 1)δN − (+ 1)z¯N θˆN
]
(
δN + z¯N θˆN
)3 < 0
mˆ′(θˆN ) =
ΦN θˆ
−1
N
(
δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
(
δNδS + ΦN θˆN + ΦS θˆ

S
)2 > 0
mˆ′′(θˆN ) =
ΦN θˆ
−2
N
(
δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
) [
(− 1)
(
δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
− (+ 1)ΦN θˆN
]
(
δNδS + ΦN θˆN + ΦS θˆ

S
)3 < 0.
Finally, equation (A2) can be rewritten as follows
kN (θˆN ) = ΨN
[
λmˆη(θˆN ) + (1− λ)nˆηN (θˆN )
] 1
η
. (A2.1)
Since the functional form of kˆN (θˆN ) depends on nˆN (θˆN ) and mˆ(θˆN ), which are monotonically
increasing and concave, we can conclude that kˆ′N (θˆN ) > 0 and kˆ
′′
N (θˆN ) < 0. That completes
the proof of Lemma 1.
We now turn to the steady-state value of the Northern market tightness, θˆN . Using kˆS(θˆN ),
kˆN (θˆN ), nˆS(θˆN ), nˆN (θˆN ) and mˆ(θˆN ) to substitute into equation (SS12), we obtain the following
steady-state condition for the Northern market tightness
(δN + ρ) γN θˆN [1 + (χ− 1)µN ]
(
2ΦN θˆ

N + (1 + φ)δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
=
= ΨαN (1− χ) (1− µN )
(
δN + zN θˆ

N
)(
ΦN θˆ

N + δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
×
× (1− α)AN
[
λ
(
ΦN θˆ

N
ΦN θˆN + δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
η + (1− λ)
(
zN θˆ

N
δN + zN θˆN
)η] 1η
. (A7)
Lemma 2 (a) the function appearing on the left-hand side of (A7) is monotonically in-
creasing and convex within θˆN ∈ (0,∞), and the function appearing on the right-hand side of
(A7) is monotonically increasing and concave within θˆN ∈ (0,∞); (b) There exists only one
intersecting point between the left- and right-hand side of (A7).
Proof. We begin by demonstrating the first part of the Lemma. The left- and right-hand-
side of (A7) can be defined as follows
LHS(θˆN ) = (δN + ρ) γN θˆN [1 + (χ− 1)µN ]
(
2ΦN θˆ

N + (1 + φ)δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
RHS(θˆN ) = Ψ
α−1
N (1− χ) (1− µN ) g(θˆN )h(θˆN )(1− α)AN kˆN (θˆN ),
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where g(θˆN ) ≡
(
δN + zN θˆ

N
)
, h(θˆN ) ≡
(
ΦN θˆ

N + δNδS + ΦS θˆ

S
)
, and kˆN (θˆN ) is defined by
equation (A2.1).
Function LHS(θˆN ) approaches 0 when θˆN approaches 0, and +∞ when θˆN approaches +∞.
Since µN ∈ (0, 1), we have that
LHS′(θˆN ) = γN (δN + ρ) [(χ− 1)µN + 1]
[
2 (+ 1)PN θˆ

N + (φ+ 1) δNδS + PSθ

S
]
> 0
LHS′′(θˆN ) = 2(+ 1)γNPN (δN + ρ) ((χ− 1)µN + 1) θˆ−1N > 0.
All these considerations lead us to conclude that the left-hand side of (A7) is monotonically
increasing and concave for θˆN > 0.
We now turn to function RHS(θˆN ). RHS(θˆN ) approaches 0 when θˆN approaches 0, while it
approaches +∞ when θˆN approaches +∞. Taking first and second derivatives of functions g(θˆN )
and h(θˆN ), it is easy to check that both functions are monotonically increasing and concave.
Since all components of RHS(θˆN ) are monotonically increasing and concave for θˆN ∈ (0,∞),
we can conclude that the function RHS(θˆN ) is monotonically increasing and concave as well.
As a result, there exists only one intersecting point within θˆN ∈ (0,∞) such that LHS(θˆN ) =
RHS(θˆN ). That demonstrates the second part of the Lemma. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the result obtained in Lemma 2. As LHS(θˆN )
is convex and RHS(θˆN ) is concave, and both functions approach 0 as θˆN approaches 0, there
exists only one value θˆN ∈ (0,∞) that solves equation (A7). Once θˆN is obtained, kˆS , kˆN , nˆS ,
nˆN and mˆ can be recovered.
Figure 1: Steady-state value of the Northern labor market tightness.
Finally, using equation (SS5) to substitute Rˆ in equation (SS3), and plugging kˆS , kˆN , nˆS ,
nˆN , mˆ, θˆS and θˆN into equations (SS3), (SS4), (SS6), (SS7), and (29), we obtain the steady-state
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values for variables cˆS , cˆN , τˆS , τˆN and Ωˆ
cˆS = AS kˆ
α
S nˆ
1−α
S +
χ (1− α)λAN kˆαN [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η mˆη
1− (1− χ)µN −
− γS θˆS (1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ)− µN (1− nS) [mˆ+ φ (1− mˆ− nˆS)]
1 + mˆ+ φ (1− mˆ− nˆS) ×
× χ (1− α) (1− λ)AN kˆ
α
N [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
(1−α−η)
η nˆη−1N
1− (1− χ)µN +
+
φµN (1− mˆ− nˆS) χ(1−α)λAN kˆ
α
N [(1−λ)nˆηN+λmˆη ]
1−α−η
η mˆη−1
1−(1−χ)µN
1 + mˆ+ φ (1− mˆ− nˆS)
cˆN = AN kˆ
α
N
[
(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη
](1−α)/η − γN θˆN [φ (1− nˆS − mˆ+ 1− nˆN )] +
+
µN (1− nˆS) [mˆ+ φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)] χ(1−α)(1−λ)AN kˆ
α
N [(1−λ)nˆηN+λmˆη ]
(1−α−η)
η nˆη−1N
1−(1−χ)µN
1 + mˆ+ φ (1− mˆ− nˆS) −
−
µNφ (1− mˆ− nˆS) χ(1−α)λAN kˆ
α
N [(1−λ)nˆηN+λmˆη ]
1−α−η
η mˆη−1
1−(1−χ)µN
1 + mˆ+ φ (1− mˆ− nˆS) −
− χ (1− α)λAN kˆ
α
N [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η mˆη
1− (1− χ)µN
τˆS = µS
χAS (1− α) (1− φ) (1− nˆS − mˆ)
[1− (1− χ)µS ] [1− mˆ− φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)]
(
kˆS
nˆS
)α
τˆN = µNχ (1− α)AN kˆαN [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η ×
×
{
(1− nˆN ) (1− λ) nˆη−1N + φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)λmˆη−1
[1− (1− χ)µN ] [1 + mˆ+ φ (1− nˆS − mˆ)]
}
Ωˆ =
(1− χ) (1− µN ) (1− α)AN kˆαN [(1− λ)nˆηN + λmˆη]
1−α−η
η{
αAN kˆ
−(1−α)
N
[
λmˆη + (1− λ)nˆηN
] 1−α
η + δN
}
[1− (1− χ)µS ]
×
×
[
λmˆη−1 − (1− λ) nˆη−1N
]
,
which are always uniquely determined within θˆN ∈ (0,∞). That completes the proof of Propo-
sition 1.
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B Sensitivity analysis on Southern replacement rate
This appendix provides results for the sensitivity analysis on the replacement rate in South,
µS , for both the benchmark and extended versions of the model. In particular, we compare
the benchmark parametrization (µS = 0.31) with two extreme cases: (i) the case in which
social protection for unemployed workers in South is absent (µS = 0); (ii) the case in which
the Southern government provides the same social protection scheme as in North by setting the
same replacement rate (µS = 0.62).
Baseline Extension
Variable µS = 0.31 µS = 0 µS = 0.62 µS = 0.31 µS = 0 µS = 0.62
cN 0.54 0.48 0.65 0.44 0.39 0.54
cS 0.51 0.57 0.45 -1.2 -1.12 -1.41
kN 1.11 1 1.33 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15
kS -1.87 -2.5 -1.88 0.1 0.07 0.17
nN -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06
nS -1.87 -2.5 -1.88 0.1 0.07 0.17
m 10.59 10.93 9.82 -0.61 -0.54 -0.73
θN -0.5 -0.44 -0.61 -1.41 -1.23 -1.8
θS 0 0 0 0 0 0
YN 1.11 1 1.33 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15
YS -1.87 -2.5 -1.88 0.11 0.07 0.17
wN 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0. -0. -0.
wM -0.45 -0.47 -0.4 -6.73 -6.73 -6.73
wS 0 0 0 0 0 0
ΠN 1.11 1 1.33 -0.83 -0.71 -1.08
ΠS -1.87 -1.5 -2.5 0.1 0.07 0.17
R 6.76 7.57 5.09 -20.11 -18.27 -24.42
WN 0.2 0.18 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.2
WS 0.35 0.4 0.29 -0.82 -0.79 -0.92
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis on µS – steady-state variations in percentage points.
Table 6 shows that the results obtained in Section 3 and 4 hold mostly unaffected: all
steady-state variations preserve the same sign as in the benchmark parametrization, with modest
differences in magnitudes across the three different cases.
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